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LAW REPORTS. 
HIGH COURT OF. JUST ICE .  
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. 
June 6th, 1899. 
A. Lo SMITH, L.5~ RIGDY, L.J., AND "VAUG'HAN "WILLIAMS, L~ 
wAss~xw v: B~mHOUS~. COrPORATIOn. 
Local Government---Condemnation of meat unfit for food of man--  
Compensation--Arbitration--Jurisdiction of arbitrator--Costs of 
magisterial proceedings--Public Health Act, 1875 (38 and 39 Vic., 
cap. 55), Sections 116, 117, and 308. 
Where meat has been condemned and ordered to be destroyed by a magistrate 
a's u~t  ,for the food of ~nan, and the owner of the meat claims com- 
pensation ~tnder SectioT~ 308 of the Public .Health Act, 1875, the 
arbitrator a29pointed to award com]Jcnsation under that sectioT~ has 
jurisdiction to decide the questio1~ of the soundness of the meat, a~ 
may award as t~art of the com2ensation the ex_penses incurred by the 
claimant i~ 1~roceedings before the magistrate. 
APp-.At. by the defendants from a judgment of Day, J., without a jury. 
The facts were these : The sanitary inspector and the medical officer 
of health for the district of Brighouse, acting under Section 116 of the 
Public Health Act, 1875, inspected a carcase belonging to the plaintiff, 
which had been deposited at the public slaughter-house at ]3righouse 
for the purpose of preparation for sale, and was intended for the food 
of man, and dame m the conclusion that the carcase was diseased and 
unfit for the food of man. They thereupon showed i~ to a Justice of 
~he Peace, who on October 19th, 1897, upon examination and inspection, 
found that the carcase was diseased and unfit for the food of man, and 
acting under Section 117 of the Public Health Act, 1875, and Section 28, 
Sub-section 9., of the :Public Health Act, 1890, ordered it to be destroyed, 
a~ !t was destroyed accordingly. A summons waa then issued sum- 
momng ~he plaintiff to appear before a court of summary jurisdiction 
to answer an information laid by the medical officer to the effect ha~ 
~he carcase belonged to the plaintiff, and was deposited for the purpose 
of preparation for sale, and was intended for the food of man, and was 
diseased, and to show cause why he should not be fined or imprisoned 
under Section 117 of the Public Health Ae~, 1875. This summons was 
dismissed upon the ground that as the carcase was not in the possession 
of the plaintiff, or exposed for sale, there was no offence under that 
section. No order was made by the justices as to costs, and no further 
proceedings were taken against he plaintiff. 
The plaintiff, not being content with the finding of the magistrate 
that the carcase was diseased and unfit for the food of man, made a 
claim against he defendants, the local authority, for damage sustained 
by him by reason of the exercise by them through their officers of their 
powers under Sections 116 and 117 of the Public Health Ae~, 1875, in 
certifying that the carcase was diseased, and having the same condemned 
and destroyed accordingly. The defendants disputing the fact of damage 
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and the amount of compensation (if any) to be paid, the plaintiff ap- 
pointed an arbitrator under Sections 808 and 179 of the Public Health 
Act, 1875, and gave notice to the defendants of the appointment. The 
defendants ook no steps in the matter, and accordingly, by Section 180 
of the Public Health Act, 1875, the arbitrator appointed by the plaintiff 
became sole arbitrator between the parties At the hearing the plaintiff 
tendered, and the arbitrator, overruling the defendants' objections, 
admitted evidence that the carcase was sound, wholesome, and in every 
way fit for the food of man on October 19th. 
The arbitrator in due course made his award, which, after reciting 
the facts above stated, continued in these words :
" I find as facts :. 1. That the seizure and condemnation of t.he said 
carcase was made . . . .  2. That the said magisterial information was 
laid and dismissed as alleged. 3. That the said carcase was not diseased, 
or unsound, or unwholesome, or unfit for the food of man on the said 
19th day of October, 1897, when the said order to destroy the same 
was made. 4. That the said carcase on the 19th day of October, 1897, 
when the same was ordered to be destroyed as aforesaid, was sound, 
wholesome, and fit for the food of man. 5. That the said David 
Walshaw, by reason of the exercise of the said powers, has sustained 
damages as follows : 
s s .d .  
"(a) The loss of the said carcase 9 . . . . . . . .  7 10 0 
"(b) Expenses of and incident o the said seizure, and of 
and incident o defending hbnself in the said magis- 
terial proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . .  37 1 0 
"(r Loss in his said business which immediately and neces- 
sarily flowed from the said seizure, condemnation,' 
and magisterialproceeding . . . . . . . . .  52 0 0 
.s 11 0" 
The arbitrator further ordered and directed that the defendants 
should pay to the plaintiff his costs of and incidental to the reference 
and costs of the award, and that the defendants should bear their own 
costs of the same. 
9 The plaintiff brought an action upon this award, and the case was 
heard at Leeds before Day, J., without a iury. Evidence that the 
carcase was unsound and unfit for the food of man was tendered by 
the defendants, but rejected by the learned Judge, who gave judgment 
for the plMntiff. 
The defendants appealed. 
Macmorran, Q.C., and T. 1L D. Wright, for the defendants: The 
arbitrator had no power to deal with the question whether the carcase 
was sound or not. That was a question going to the liability or default 
of the plaintiff. The extent of the arbitrator's powers is defined by 
Section 308, as interpreted by the House of Lords in Brierley .Hill 
Local .Board v. PcarsaU [1884].* "The  fact of damage" and " the 
amount of compensation " are the only questions which the arbitrator 
has pc@or to decide. He cannot enter on the question ~:,hether or not 
the claimant for compensation is " himself in default. That is a 
question of law which ought to have been raised and decided in an 
action on the award, not in the arbitration. The plaintiff came before 
the arbitrator as a person himself in default, the carcase having been 
* 54 L. J., Q.B. 25; 9 App. Cas., 595. 
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de facto condemhed. The magistrate's finding was intended by the 
Legislature to be conclusive on the question of the soundness of the 
meat, except as a foundation for criminal proceedings--tVaye v.
Thoml~soT~ ~1885]~:~--and the arbitrator ought to have proceeded on that 
basis. I t  was never intended that he should sit on appeal from the 
magistrate's finding. The proper tribunal for that is the Court of 
Quarter Sessions--Section 269--or, at the instance of the local authorif.y, 
the High Court--Section 107. The whole duty of the arbitrator was 
to assess the damages--Davies and ~hondda Urbm~ Cou~cil, In re 
[1899].t :Even if he has to decide on the soundness of the meat in 
order to arrive at the fact of damage, his finding on the question of 
soundness is not conclusive,'so far as that question goes to the liability 
of the appellants. Their liability is a question of law which ought to 
have been dealt wzth by the Court below--see ~er Lord ]~ttz~,erald, 
13rierlcy Hill Local Board v. Pearsall.$ The learned Judge ought, 
therefore, to have admitted evidence and given judgment on this point, 
and he was wrong in holding that the finding of the arbitrator was 
conclusive. 
The expenses of the proceedings before the magistrate are not damage 
sustained " by reason of the exercise of any of the powers of this Act." 
The summons was taken out Under the Summary Jurisdiction Acts, 
and the order mad8 thereon is an order no~ of the local authority, bu~ 
of the court of summary jurisdiction. The plaintiff may have a right 
at common law to damages for instituting proceedings without reason- 
able and probable cause, but he cannot recover them under the Public 
Health Act. 
[A. L. S:atTn, L.J. : Bater and Birlcenhead Co~Toratiol~ , In re [1893],w 
is against hat contention.] 
There the claimant for compensation had incurred expense in defend. 
ing himself from the exercise of the powers of the Act by calling 
witnesses as to the condition of the meat before the Justice who was 
asked to condemn it. Not so here. No more compensation can be 
recovered under Section 308 than could be recovered in an action of 
trespass--New 2~irer Coml~any v. Joh~soT~ }[1860].]] The magistrate 
made no order as to costs, and accordingly the costs of the proceeding 
before him could not be recovered in an action of trespass, and there- 
fore cannot be recovered under Section 308. 
Scott Fox, Q.C., IF. 3". IFmlgh, IF. Madd~7~, and'G.  P. Walker, for 
the plaintiff, were not called upon. 
A. L. S:,HTH, L.J. : The arbitrator has drawn his award in the righ~ 
form. I t  is not in form a decision on the question of the appellants' 
liability, but is a finding of facts upon which a court of law may decide 
that question. By Section 308 of the Public Health Act, 1875, "Where 
any person sustains any damage by reason of the exercise of any of the 
powers of this Act in relation to any matter as to which he is not him- 
self in default " - - the respondent says he has suffered such damage-  
"ful l  compensation shallbe made to such person by the local authority 
exercising such powers "mI  will deal with the compensation presently 
- - "  and any dispute as to the fact of damage or amoun~ of compensation 
shall be settled by arbitration." What is the meaning of " the  fact of 
damage"? These words have been construed by Lord Selborne'and 
* 54 L. J., M.C. 140 ; 15 Q.B.D., 3i2. T 107 L. T. J'., 62. 
,r 54 L. J., Q.B., at p. 29 ; 9 App. Cas., at p. 603. 
69, L. J., M.C., 107 ; [1893] 9, Q.B., 77. 
29 L. J., M.C., 93 ; 2 E. and E., 435. 
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Lord Fitzgerald in .Brierlcy Hil l  Local Board v. Pearsall.* Lord 
Selborne there says: "That  mutter of fact no doubt cannot be ascer- 
tained without dealing with the actual state of facts, whatever it may 
be found to be; and that actual state of facts may possibly raise 
.questions of law as to what is or what is not done properly' in the 
exercise of any of the powers of the Act,' and also as to what is and 
what is not a default on the part of the claimant. :But the inquiry 
does not cease to be an inquiry into the facts, though the facts may 
raise questions of law. If the arbitrator goes into the inquiry, as he 
.ought, as a question of fact, and if he deals with the facts as he finds 
them, but deals with them in a wrong view of those facts according to 
law, then no doubt his award will not be final." But it is not suggested 
that the arbitrator in this case has dealt with the facts in any wrong 
view. Then Lord Fitzgerald says: " In establishing his case under 
that  section "--Section 308--" the plaintiff had to sustain four pro- 
positions, viz., first, that he had sustained amage ; secondly, that such 
damage had been occasioned by reason of the exercise by the local 
authority of the powers of the Act; thirdly, that such damage arose in 
relation to some matter as to which he was not himself in default; 
and, fourthly, the amount of compensation to which he was properly 
entitled. Any dispute as to propositions 1 and 4 is to be settled by 
arbitration. The fact of damage comes first in the section, and is the 
foundation of all the rest. In the execution of his duties, it is difficult 
to  see how the arbitrator can avoid inquiring whether the acts com- 
plained of were matters done in the exercise of the powers of the Act, 
and as to which the claimant was not himself in default, so as to limit 
the scope of his assessment of compensation ; but his decision, if any, 
us to the liability of the defendants in poiut of law would not be binding, 
and would be inoperative." If the award involves an error in law, it 
is open to the party sued upon the award to set up tha question of law 
as a defence to the action. Here the arbitrator finds that in exercise 
of an'd accordance with or pretended exercise or virtue of the powers 
and provisions of the Public Health Act, 1875, the defendants by their 
9 otl]cer on October 19th, 1897, seized the carcase and caused the same 
to be condemned by a Justice of the Peace ; and that the carcase was 
not diseased, or unsound, or unwholesome, or unfit for the food of man 
on October 19th, when the order to destroy the same was made. I t  is 
said that he ought not to have gone into the questioh of the soundness 
of the meat. :But how otherwise could he find the fact of damage? 
In order to find that fact he must go into the question of the soundness. 
Then it is said he has not addressed himself to the question whether 
the claim for compensation was in relation to a matter as to which the 
claimant was not himself in default. But if the carcase was sound, 
how was the claimant in default ? It  is argued that he was in default 
immediately on the finding by the magistrate that the carcase was 
unsound. But unless it w~ unsound in fact, he never came within 
Sections 116 and 117 at all. 
The plaintiff having thus lost the carcase and been put to expense, it 
is next contended that the damage was not caused through the act of 
the defendants. But it was all the result of a blunder by their officer 
acting in the course of his duty. Then it is said that he cannot recover 
the ~e37 ls., the expenses of the proceedings. I ask myself, Why not ? 
The words of Section 308 are "full compensation shall be made." The 
54 L. J., Q.B., 25 ; 9 App. C~., 595. 
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only question is, Had the plaintiff .s ls. less in pocket through the 
action of the local authority? I t  is said that these expenses are costs ;
but Bater and .Birkenhead Corporation, In re,* is an authority that they 
may be recovered notwithstanding. True, in that case the claimant 
,for compensation appeared before the Justice to show cause why the 
meat should not be condemned; but what difference does it make 
whether the expense is incurred before or after condemnation ? In the 
words of Lord Esher, hI.R, "We are bound to read Section 30S in its 
ordinary and grammatical sense. The words used are very wide, and 
it seems to me that they must include any pecuniary loss which a man 
suffers when he is not himself in default." I think these are expenses 
for the payment of which the respondent was entitled to full compensa- 
tion, and this appeal must be dismissed. 
RmBY, L.J . :  I am of the same opinion. It is the duty  of the 
arbitrator to make his award upon the fact of damage and the amount 
of compensation. He could not do this without investigating the 
question whether the carcase was sound or not. 
VAUOrrAN Wtr,LLi~tS, L.J. : I entirely agree as to the result of the 
decisions in .Brierley Hill l"~ocal .Board v. l~earsall.t There can be no 
doubt that the arbitrator was acting within his jurisdiction in finding 
that the meat was unsound, and his finding caunot be disputed by 
anyone interested. I understood.at one time in the arg'ament that ig 
was meant to be suggested that  there had been a judicial order con- 
demning the meat and determining its unsoundness. In my judgment, 
the order for condemnation of the meat under Section 117 is.nothing 
of the sort. I do not say that in some cases an order made under that 
section might no~ be judicial, so that it would have to be got rid of to 
enable the parties to raise the question of fact again, but in this case ig 
is clear that the order was administrative, and not one that would have 
to be got rid of before compensation could be obtained. 
As to the costs incurred in consequence of the summons, it is no~ 
disputed that the inspector and the m.edical officer were officers'of the 
defendants, and that the defendants are responsible for whatever was 
done by them. But it is said that these costs would not have been 
recoverable as damages in an action for trespass, and so they cannot be 
taken into consideration i awarding compensation. With the general 
proposition as to the recovery of such costs as damages I agree ; that 
is to say, that there could not have been included in the damages in 
the action costs in respect of which there had been an adjudication by 
a court of competent jurisdiction; and it may be doubtful whether 
even under the words " full compensation " such costs could have been 
included, gu~ even if the case of Bater and .Birkenhead Corporation, 
Iu re,$ were put aside as not applicable to this ease, it seems to me 
that there would have been a common-law right in an action of trespass 
to have these costs considered in the assessment of damages. I entirely 
agree that if the matter had been before a court which had power to 
adjudicate upon the costs, and had adjudicated, no one could in any 
subsequent action go behind that adjudication, or go outside it in any 
way. But in the present ease, as there was no adjudication of any sort 
or kind on costs, there is nothing to prevent damages or compensation 
being assessed on the basis of including the costs in the assessment. 
A2Teal dismissed. 
~: 62 L. J., hI.C, 107 ; [1893] 2 Q.]~., 77. 
~ 54 L. J., Q.B, 25 ; 9 App. Cas., 595: 62 L. J., M.C., 107 ; [1893] 2 Q.B., 77. 
